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ABSTRACT:  This study utilizes 
Panel Logit Models applied to a set of 
macroeconomic, financial, and political 
variables to estimate the debt rescheduling 
probabilities of 15 Eastern European 
countries during the transition period from 
1990-2005. These transition economies 
became a very attractive region for foreign 
investment. Specifically, the region became 
the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows 
among all emerging market regions in 
2005. Therefore, it is relevant for policy 
makers and institutional and private 
foreign investors to investigate factors that 
influence debt rescheduling probabilities, 
as these may directly affect the size of 
and return on investments in these 
countries. Our findings suggest that policy 
efforts focused on reducing government 
expenditure, attracting foreign direct 
investment, increasing export revenues, 
and keeping a good repayment record result 
in low debt rescheduling probabilities and, 
in turn, decrease the cost of debt for these 
countries. This is a common finding for all 
countries in the sample, including those 
that have become EU members.
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1. INTRODUCTION
All major international investors and banks use sovereign debt default rates 
to price sovereign bonds and loans, as well as to determine country risk. 
Furthermore, in recent years many developing countries have negotiated new 
loan repayment schedules with their governments and commercial bank lenders. 
The aim of this study is to specify a model which would allow prediction of 
sovereign default/rescheduling rates with higher accuracy, particularly tailored 
for investors interested in the Eastern Europe (EE) region.
The group of 15 EE countries used in this study share similarities in respect of 
social, political, geographical, economic, and cultural characteristics. Most of the 
recent studies of sovereign debt problems looked at the middle income countries 
of Latin America, Asia, or Africa, but none of them paid special attention to 
the emerging markets of Eastern Europe and their transition period to market 
economies. Several earlier studies include data for some of these countries in their 
multi-country data set: however, due to specific common characteristics of EE 
countries, it is questionable whether conclusions from previous studies looking at 
all emerging markets can be directly applied to EE countries. Therefore this paper 
will focus on EE countries, as the very first attempt to model debt rescheduling 
probabilities for this region. 
This paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) What are the most 
important determinants of EE sovereign debt rescheduling? (2) How accurately 
do those determinants predict sovereign debt rescheduling? (3) How to specify a 
model that would allow more accurate prediction of EE sovereign rescheduling? 
Answers to these questions could be used to derive implications for policy makers 
and potential creditors and investors in the region. 
The countries included in the study are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Montenegro and 
the Slovak Republic. The regions’ debt rescheduling probabilities are tested for 
the effects of a wide range of macroeconomic, financial, and political indicators. 
2. LITERATURE REvIEW
A series of financial crises and defaults starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(see e.g. Camdessus, 1986 and Cuddington and Smith, 1985), and later incidents, DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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culminating in Argentina’s default in 2001, prompted an intense debate about 
how to prevent crises. As pointed out by Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig 
(2003) the literature on debt crisis falls into four broad categories: theoretical 
models of sovereign default, empirical studies of the determinants of debt crisis, 
empirical studies of the predictive power of credit ratings, and empirical studies 
of the determination of spreads. Given the aims of our study, the literature we 
review is focused on the determinants of debt rescheduling and the models used 
to predict it. 
One of the earlier studies by Frank and Cline (1971) applied discriminate analysis 
to show that it is possible to obtain a very high prediction rate using only two 
factors, the debt service ratio and the average maturity of debt. Among the first 
studies using logit analysis were Feder and Just (1977) followed by Feder, Just and 
Ross (1981) and Feder and Uy (1985). The authors point out that the analysis of the 
growth record of many economies indicates that foreign capital is an important 
factor in the process of economic development. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
developed a model of borrowing with default, showing that lenders establish debt 
ceilings above which they are unwilling to increase loans. Further, McFaden et 
al. (1985) estimate crisis probabilities using data on 93 countries from 1970-1982, 
concluding that although an econometric model can help to explain sovereign 
debt problems, it is extremely difficult to develop an early warning system that 
would predict debt crises in advance, as countries may experience heterogeneous 
repayment problems. They find that the debt burden, the level of per capita income, 
real GDP growth, and liquidity measures such as non-gold reserves are significant 
predictors of debt crisis, while the changes in real exchange rates are not.
In most of the empirical studies two groups of main variables were constantly 
included in the econometric analyses: short-term or liquidity factors (also known 
as traditional debt or financial ratios: debt/GDP, reserves/imports and debt 
service/export), and long term variables (GDP growth, investment, inflation). For 
example, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) find solvency problems 
measured through high total external debt to GDP ratio and liquidity problems 
measured through short term debt to be highly associated with debt rescheduling. 
Hemming and Petrie (2000) present a discussion on fiscal sustainability and 
develop vulnerability indicators. Hemming and Chalk (2000) for the first time 
systematically examine the link between fiscal and external sustainability. 
Further, Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) study the importance of liquidity 
factors such as short-term debt, debt service, and the level of international 
reserves in predicting debt crises, and find that less liquid countries are more 
likely to default. Additionally, they find that countries that are more open are in 10
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a better position to service debt and that an overvalued exchange rate hurts the 
future export performance of a country. 
Krugman (1987) built a theoretical model that highlights the importance of the 
“debt overhang” of the developing nations and derives policy implications about 
the desirability of forgiving or refinancing such debt. Berg and Sachs (1988) found 
that higher income inequality is a significant predictor of a higher probability of 
debt rescheduling in the middle income countries. Also, the open trade regime 
is a significant predictor of a reduced probability of debt rescheduling. As they 
pointed out, earlier studies such as McFadden et al. (1985) identify variables that 
are more the symptoms of the crises rather than their fundamental causes. 
Political risk and institutional variables are also found to play a key role in 
determining debt rescheduling among emerging market countries. Balkan (1992) 
was the first to find an inverse relationship between rescheduling probabilities for 
one country and its level of democracy, as well as a direct relationship between 
probability of rescheduling and political instability. More recent evidence 
of the significance of the political variable can be found in Haque, Nelson 
and Mathieson (1998). Brewer and Rivoli (1997) showed that the inclusion of 
political variables in forecasting models improves the correct prediction rate of 
rescheduling probability by 9% to 12% for the earlier periods and 18% to 35% 
for later periods. Citron and Nickelsburg (1986) point out that the political 
variable is in fact a non-diversifiable risk, and identify waves of default which 
tend to occur in approximately thirty year cycles and typically involve many 
countries. Georgievska et al. (2009) confirm the importance of political factors 
in determining debt rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets. Kraay 
and Nehru (2004) were the first to point out that the quality of institutions and 
policies has a key impact on rescheduling. Further, Butler and Fauver (2006) 
found that the quality of a country’s legal and political institutions play a vital 
role in determining sovereign credit ratings. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) find that 
the flows of capital from rich to poor countries are largely governed by sovereign 
default probabilities. 
A number of studies are also assessing the impact of past debt repayment records 
on future rescheduling. For example, Carmen (1992), McFadden et al (1985) and 
Aylward and Thorne (1998) find that poor debt repayment history is a strong 
indicator of future problems. 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) use financial market data to analyze the behaviour 
of CDSs spreads. Schwartz and Zurita (1992) develop a model which determines DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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the optimal amount of debt to borrow based on the production possibilities of the 
country, time preferences, and the risk-free interest rate. The study also gives the 
optimal level of debt default penalty: the higher the penalty that can be imposed 
on the country in the event of default the lower the probability of default but 
the higher the problem of underinvestment. These arguments are relevant when 
considering possible new debt authorization in the countries of Eastern Europe.
2.1. EE Countries’ Recent Economic Position 
The European Central Bank considers investing in EE countries during the 
transition period as potentially problematic due to two main reasons1: 1) 
credit growth can affect financial stability and financing ‘bad’ projects will 
eventually turn into bad debt or result in a build-up of large external debt, and 2) 
policymakers and market participants need to assess and monitor credit growth 
developments, as in the past they have been associated with the emergence of 
financial and currency crises.
In the early years of the transition most EE countries experienced a significant 
slump in GDP, which was followed by a period of rapid economic growth. In some 
cases rapid privatization of the banking sector and expansion of underdeveloped 
financial markets resulted in lending booms, followed by credit crunches 
and crises that spilled over to the region as a whole. Hoti (2005), for example, 
analyses country-specific and regional 1) economic, 2) financial, 3) political and 
4) composite risk factors for six Balkan countries and documents significant 
country spill-over effects.
Eastern Europe is the only emerging market region with systematic current 
account deficits in 2005-2006. According to Roubini and Menegatti (2006) 
countries that have large current account deficits above 4% of GDP are Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Slovakia, while Schaffer (2007) reports that Estonia and Latvia have 
current account deficits even above 10%, which makes these countries similar to 
Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region of Serbia 
and Montenegro. At the same time some of these countries are recording high 
lending growth since most of them finance current account deficits by FDI. Most 
of the other emerging markets in Asia and Latin America are running current 
account surpluses. Since many previous episodes of financial crisis in emerging 
market economies have been associated, among other factors, with large current 
account deficits, it is important to examine the EE group of countries separately. 
1  Financial Stability Rewiew, ECB (2006)12
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The average growth rate of credit in the 2001-2005 period has been very high in all 
countries in our sample except Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (see Egert 
et al. (2006), Kiss and Nagy (2006), Coricelli et al. (2006), European Commission 
(2006), ECB Financial Stability Review (2006) and World Bank Regular Economic 
Report (2007)). In addition, Hungary observed asset bubbles in its equity and 
housing markets. Schafer (2006) indicates that these countries’ economic boom 
is financed by foreign lending, and concludes that it may lead to financial crisis. 
World Economic Outlook (2006) reports that the region’s generally large current 
account deficit partly reflects favourable investment opportunities in the EE 
region. In some countries capital inflows were associated not just with private 
sector financial imbalances but also with substantial fiscal imbalances (e.g. 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). However, WEO (2006) stresses that the large net 
capital inflows are increasing not in the form of FDI but rather in the form of other 
(more volatile) flows, including short-term debt. Specifically, the EE region became 
the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in 
2005. This has implications for policymakers and potential investors who need to 
examine the trade-off between sovereign capacities and risks involved.
Roubini and Menegatti (2006) distinguish between solvency and liquidity 
variables in the EE region, which are also potential determinants of sovereign 
debt rescheduling. This study reports high and rising levels of external debt as a 
share of GDP, especially for Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Estonia, and 
of debt to export ratio for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Romania. Liquidity risk measured as a share of money in foreign exchange 
reserves (M2/FX ratio) is well above one for all countries in the sample of this study. 
In addition, the short term debt/FX ratio is rising in Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. Gross external financing needs (measured as short term debt 
plus current account deficit as a share of foreign exchange reserves) are also greater 
than one for all countries. Public sector vulnerabilities are presented through the 
share of foreign currency public debt in total debt, which is greater than 50% in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The share of short-term public debt in total debt is high (above 30%) in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, and medium (20-30%) in Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, 
and Slovakia. Public debt to GDP ratio is high (above 50%) only in Hungary and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, a more relevant measure of solvency, pubic debt 
to government revenues ratio, is relatively high (above 100%) in a larger set of 
countries: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overall, 
general government deficits are medium to high in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Romania. DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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Note that nine of the selected countries in our sample are members of the 
European Union (EU): Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, and very recently Romania and Bulgaria. This will be 
taken into account in our models.
3. DATA SAMPLE
Annual data on rescheduling events and determinants of rescheduling is collected 
for 15 EE countries over the period 1990-2005. Our study includes countries of 
Central EE (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Poland), 
South EE (Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania), Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
and Russia. The reason for this lies in their common historical heritage and initial 
economic conditions with which they started the period of transition in the early 
1990s.
3.1. Defining the Dependent variable: default or rescheduling event
Previous literature shows that there is no single empirical definition of what 
should constitute a sovereign debt crisis, a default, or a rescheduling event (see for 
example Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003), Ciarlone and Trebeschi 
(2005), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Hajivassiliou (1987), Odedokun (1995) and 
Kraay and Nehru (2004)). Broadly speaking, a default is any failure by a debtor to 
meet its contractual obligations. The main event of default is missing a scheduled 
payment of principal or interest. 
In this paper the dependent variable is defined as the “total amount of debt 
rescheduled”, as is reported in the World Bank - Global Development Finance 
2006 (GDF)2. If there was report of rescheduling on any of the component items, 
we have considered that the country rescheduled. 
2  including debt stock rescheduled, interest rescheduled capitalized, interest rescheduled 
official, interest rescheduled private, principal rescheduled official, principal rescheduled 
private, and principal rescheduled. Debt from official creditors includes loans from 
international organizations (such as the World Bank, EBRD, or other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies) and loans from governments (bilateral loans). Debt from 
private creditors include bonds, commercial bank loans from private banks and other private 
financial institutions, and other private credits (from manufacturers, exporters, suppliers of 
goods, and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export credit agency)14
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In the model that we intend to use the event of whether or not rescheduling took 
place is a dichotomous and qualitative variable. Therefore, the dependent variable 
is a binary variable possessing only two possible values or outcomes: 
Rescheduling it = 
Table 1:  Sample and Data
Country Period examined Rescheduling 
Albania 1993-2005 5
Bulgaria 1992-2005 5
Bosnia & Hertzegovina 2000-2005 1
Czeck Republic 1994-2005 0
Estonia 1994-2005 0
Croatia 1994-2005 4
Hungary 1990-2005 0
Lithuania 1994-2005 0
Latvia 1994-2005 0
Macedonia 1997-2005 3
Poland 1991-2005 4
Romania 1991-2005 0
Russia 1995-2005 10
Serbia & Montenegro 2001-2005 3
Slovak Republic 1994-2005 0
Total 1990-2005 35
Table 1 summarizes all the countries included in the analysis, the period 
examined for each country, and the actual rescheduling observations during 
the sample periods. The final sample is comprised of 176 observations and 35 
rescheduling events. 
3.2. variables used as possible determinants of debt rescheduling 
We start our analysis with 40 macroeconomic, financial, and political indicators 
that can potentially explain countries’ sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities. 
This large number of variables will then be reduced to a significantly smaller 
number through several econometric steps, discussed in Section 4. The variables 
are divided into nine categories, specifically: 1) solvency, 2) liquidity, 3) variables 
used in currency crisis models, 4) macroeconomic variables, 5) external trade 
ratios, 6) public debt ratios, 7) financial variables, 8) past rescheduling record, DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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and 9) the political variable proxied by ICRG Index3. The list of all variables and 
the impact that each one is expected to have on the probability of rescheduling is 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Impact of selected variables on the probability of rescheduling
Variables
Impact of the increase in 
value of the variable on 
probability of rescheduling
Positive Negative
Past rescheduling record: 
Lagged Rescheduling ×
Political Variable:
ICRG Rating ×
Solvency variables:
Total Debt/GDP ×
Total Debt/Exports ×
Interest arrears on LDOD*/Exports ×
Principal arrears on LDOD*/Exports ×
Interest arrears on LDOD*/Debt ×
Principal arrears on LDOD*/Debt ×
Credit to private sector/GDP (a) ×
Real interest rate on international lending ×
Risk Premium on international landing ×
Exports/GDP ×
Exports growth rate ×
Multilateral Debt/Total Debt ×
Concessional Debt/Total Debt ×
Liquidity Variables:
Short-term Debt/Total Debt (b) ambiguous ambiguous
Interest Service due/Exports ×
Debt Service due/Exports ×
PNG**, total private nonguaranteed creditors/Exports ×
PPG***, official creditors/Exports ×
International Reserves/GDP ×
Reserve/Total Debt ×
Reserves/Imports ×
3  In the ICRG index, the political risk rating contributes 50% of the composite rating, while 
the financial and economic risk ratings each contribute 25%. Each component is assigned a 
maximum numerical value (risk points), with the highest number of points indicating the 
lowest potential risk for that component and vice versa.16
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Variable used in currency crisis models:
Devaluation of Exchange rate ×
M2/Total Reserves ×
Macroeconomic variables:
Inflation rate (consumer prices) ×
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) ×
Unemployment rate ×
Foreign Direct Investments/GDP ×
GDP per capita growth ×
GDP growth rate ×
Domestic Saving Rate ×
Extrenal trade ratios: 
Current Account Balance/GDP ×
Imports/GDP (c) ambiguous ambiguous
Public debt ratios:
Government Expenditure/GDP ×
General government balance/GDP ×
Government Revenue/GDP ×
PPG**, total public and publicly guaranteed debt/Exports ×
Financial variables:
S&P Emerging Market Index ×
Stock Traded Total Value/GDP ×
Note:
*  Long-term debt outstanding
**  Private non-guaranteed debt
***  Public and publicly guaranteed debt
(a)  If the private sector debt increases relative to the overall economy, the probability of 
rescheduling by private banks and companies increases. However, in transition countries 
this variable can be the indicator of restructuring, development, and future potentials 
for GDP growth, which has a negative relationship with the probability of sovereign 
debt rescheduling. Thus, indirectly, we expect this variable to be negatively related to the 
probability of rescheduling.
(b) The impact of this variable is ambiguous since on one hand a higher proportion of short-term 
debt in total debt can lead to liquidity risks, but on the other investors can decrease their risk 
investing in a country short-term without being exposed to rescheduling probability in the 
long term future period. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) stress that in fact countries 
with imminent debt crises can only borrow short-term.
(c) The higher the imports in relation to the size of the economy the more vulnerable the country 
to foreign shocks, and the more likely it is to reschedule its external debt. Thus the expected 
coefficient of this variable should be positive (Frenkel, 1983). However, it can be debated 
whether this is always true. The higher this ratio, the more open the economy is. Thus the 
country would not be willing to risk a trade embargo or being ostracised in the international 
economic arena due to defaulting on external debt (Odedokun, 1995). DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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The descriptive statistics associated with these variables for countries that have 
rescheduled during the sample period, as well as for those that have not, are 
presented in Table 3.
Table 3:    Complete sample of sovereign debt rescheduling determinants: 
Descriptive Statistics
All Countries 
Countries that have 
rescheduled
Countries that have not 
rescheduled
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev. Obs Mean Std.dev. Obs Mean Std.dev.
Lagged Rescheduling 176 0.239 0.427 35 0.7157 0.458 126 0.119 0.325
ICRG Rating Assigned 141 0.507 0.291 27 0.513 0.234 101 0.562 0.276
Total Debt/GDP 176 0.474 0.251 35 0.581 0.324 126 0.436 0.221
Total Debt/Exports 169 1.036 0.563 32 1.488 0.755 125 0.919 0.456
Short-term Debt/Total Debt 176 0.204 0.177 35 0.149 0.167 126 0.217 0.178
Interest Service due/
Exports
169 0.041 0.027 32 0.036 0.019 125 0.0434 0.029
PNG, total private 
nonguaranteed/Exportsts
176 0.196 0.205 35 0.117 0.146 126 0.195 0.195
PPG, official creditors/
Exports
176 0.425 0.480 35 0.852 0.557 126 0.315 0.390
PPG, total public and 
publicly guaranteed/
Exports guaranteed/
Exports
176 0.754 0.630 35 1.365 0.707 126 0.608 0.517
Debt Service due/Exports 169 0.141 0.103 32 0.077 0.041 125 0.154 0.109
Reserves/Imports 168 0.035 0.014 31 0.030 0.016 125 0.036 0.012
Exports/GDP 176 0.431 0.179 35 0.317 0.113 126 0.458 0.180
Imports/GDP 176 0.509 0.174 35 0.384 0.152 126 0.536 0.166
Current Account Balance/
GDP
173 -0.05 0.064 35 -0.028 0.091 125 -0.057 0.048
International Reserves/
GDP
170 0.156 0.073 31 0.099 0.051 125 0.163 0.069
Credit to private sector/GDP 176 0.099 0.116 35 0.042 0.049 126 0.101 0.110
GDP per capita growth 175 0.033 0.058 34 0.020 0.089 126 0.033 0.048
GDP growth rate 175 0.028 0.051 34 0.012 0.065 126 0.029 0.048
Exports growth rate  168 0.095 0.140 33 0.072 0.227 120 0.095 0.113
Inflation rate (consumer 
prices)
174 0.515 1.774 35 1.328 3.306 124 0.343 1.077
Inflation rate (GDP 
deflator)
174 0.432 1.394 34 0.999 2.524 126 0.320 0.943
Devaluation of Exchange 
rate
174 -0.12 0.376 35 -0.284 0.534 124 -0.093 0.325
Interest arrears on LDOD/
Exports
176 0.039 0.173 35 0.174 0.356 126 0.005 0.03418
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Principal arrears on 
LDOD/Exports
176 0.073 0.267 35 0.302 0.529 126 0.016 0.070
Interest arrears on LDOD/
Debt
176 0.018 0.068 35 0.081 0.136 126 0.003 0.012
Principal arrears on 
LDOD/Debt
176 0.042 0.116 35 0.170 0.210 126 0.011 0.035
Domestic Saving Rate 176 0.153 0.131 35 0.123 0.201 126 0.163 0.104
Government Expenditure/
GDP
173 0.179 0.048 34 0.183 0.048 124 0.178 0.049
M2/Total Reserves 169 0.031 0.021 31 0.042 0.021 124 0.029 0.020
S&P Emerging Market 
Index
85 0.195 0.559 6 0.539 1.265 69 0.115 0.471
Foreign Direct 
Investments/GDP
176 0.038 0.030 35 0.018 0.024 126 0.043 0.030
Real interest rate 151 0.037 0.164 29 0.034 0.278 109 0.038 0.131
Risk Premium on Landing 83 0.073 0.176 15 0.207 0.392 64 0.043 0.030
Stock Traded Total Value/
GDP
134 0.044 0.063 23 0.029 0.045 98 0.045 0.065
Unemployment rate 127 0.129 0.060 20 0.141 0.057 103 0.126 0.060
Reserve/Total Debt 170 0.459 0.384 31 0.263 0.215 125 0.505 0.416
General government 
balance/GDP
122 -0.02 0.037 19 -0.032 0.046 98 -0.019 0.034
Government Revenue/GDP 123 13.38 45.06 19 74.312 82.76 99 0.291 0.112
Multilateral Debt/Total 
Debt
176 0.146 0.146 35 0.128 0.153 126 0.149 0.137
Concessional Debt/Total 
Debt
176 0.105 0.174 35 0.126 0.191 126 0.099 0.161
The three main sources of data used to compile the set of variables described in 
Sections 3.1. and 3.2. are: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, World Bank’s 
Global Development Finance, and World Bank Development Indicators. The 
political variable, the ICRG index, is provided by the PRS Group. The frequency 
of all data is annual. To ensure the predictive power of our models, all potential 
explanatory variables from Section 3.2. are lagged by one year. 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Using all 40 variables at the same time would result in an overly complicated 
model, with many potentially significant coefficients appearing as statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, i.e. multicolinearity and over-fitting of the model 
may cause biased values of the significance test. Therefore, to eliminate less 
relevant variables, we proceed along a three-stage strategy.DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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4.1. Stage 1: Selecting Relevant variables - Univariate Panel Logit
To define a panel logit model, consider a country i observed over T periods 
of time, where t = 1,….,T and i = 1,…,N. For this country there exists an 
unobservable4 random variable y*it indicating latent propensity. Whilst we do not 
observe y*it directly, we do observe a binary outcome yit such that yit = 1(y*it > 0) 
where yit is termed the indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition 
within parentheses is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. An example of this might be the 
amount of total debt rescheduled (yit), and the capability of the country to pay its 
debts (y*it). y*it is a function of explanatory variable(s) xit, constant unobserved 
individual county effects αi and random error term uit. The following equation 
represents the above:
y*it = αi + x'it β + uit  (2)
yit is a dummy variable defined by:
For any β, the probability of observing the outcomes yit is conditional on the 
values of variable xit.
For the univariate panel logit model, the probability that a sovereign i will 
reschedule its debt at time t is given as:
 (3)
At the first stage, we run univariate panel logit regressions for each of the 40 
variables independently from one another. This will enable us to exclude from 
the final model all the variables that turn out to be insignificant in determining 
whether the sovereign reschedules its debt or not.
Through this procedure we extracted 17 variables, namely: Lagged Rescheduling 
Event, ICRG index, Export/GDP, Current Account/GDP, Total Debt/GDP, GDP 
growth rate, Foreign Direct Investment/GDP, General Government Expenditures/
GDP, Credits to Private Sectors/GDP, Short Term Debt/Total Debt, Inflation Rate, 
Exchange Rate Devaluation, Interest Arrears/Total Debt, Principal Arrears/Total 
Debt, M2/Reserves, Imports/GDP and International Reserves/GDP. However, 
4  ‘latent’ variable20
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using 17 variables in the same model can still result in a biased coefficient and 
in turn biased interpretation of which variables increase the probability of debt 
rescheduling. 
4.2. Stage 2: Selecting Relevant variables - Principal Component Analysis 
In order to eliminate any strong and persistent multicolinearity between the 
17 explanatory variables obtained from the univariate panel logit approach, in 
this next stage we resort to the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The PCA 
provides a method for simplification, combining many correlated variables into 
a smaller number of underlying factors (Hamilton (2004)). More specifically, 
PCA computes a new set of orthogonal values from a linear combination of the 
explanatory variables. PCA can be defined as:
 (4) 
where   ; the variance of the equation is maximized and Li the explanatory 
variable is orthogonal. 
In order to select how many factors to use, we consider eigenvalues from the PCA. 
For the full set of 17 explanatory variables, it was found that 5 components (factors) 
have eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 71.24% of the total variability 
in the data, and therefore regarded as significant for our further analysis. After 
rotating the factor matrix from the identification of the highest factor loadings 
for each variable on each factor, we have determined the dimension of each of the 
5 factors (components) named after the variables that dominate in each group: 
•	 Factor	 1	 –	 Solvency (Trade) Dimension: Total Debt/GDP, Foreign Direct 
Investment/GDP, Credits to Private Sectors/GDP, Imports/GDP, and 
International Reserves/GDP
•	 Factor	2	–	Liquidity Dimension: Interest Arrears/Total Debt, Principal Arrears/
Total Debt, and M2/Reserves
•	 Factor	 3	 –	 Currency Crises/Macroeconomic Dimension: Exchange Rate 
Devaluation Inflation Rate and GDP growth rate
•	 Factor	4	–	Public Debt Dimension: General Government Expenditures/GDP 
and Short Term Debt/Total Debt
•	 Factor	5	–	External Debt Dimension: Current Account/GDP.DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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Table 4:    Rotated Component Analysis Factor Matrix 
Rotated Factor Loadings – Verimax Rotation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 Uniqueness
Dimension Solvency Liquidity
Currency 
Crises
Public 
Debt
External 
Debt 
Lagged rescheduling -0.25901 0.70869* -0.04018 -0.1655 0.41683 0.22793
ICRG rating -0.422* 0.02938 -0.28118 0.06931 -0.37426 0.59711
Total debt/GDP 0.63688* 0.43336 -0.26262 0.06086 0.00979 0.33381
Short-term Debt/Total Debt 0.13345 -0.25657 0.08085 0.79881* -0.09905 0.26191
Exports/GDP 0.77124* -0.14041 0.00282 0.40539 -0.08846 0.21329
Imports/GDP 0.74658* -0.18642 0.13958 0.37571 -0.32712 0.14022
Current Account Balance/GDP -0.28283 0.1515 -0.12902 -0.05042 0.80626* 0.22782
International Reserves/GDP 0.7009* -0.27745 0.30843 -0.06134 -0.00486 0.33285
Credit to private sector/GDP 0.68583* -0.12632 0.22248 0.17689 -0.06644 0.42848
GDP growth rate 0.11705 -0.23265 0.75694* 0.09883 0.17676 0.3182
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 0.06741 0.00681 -0.79758* -0.10676 0.29335 0.26183
Devaluation of Exchange rate 0.21231 -0.07999 0.87577* 0.06967 -0.06636 0.17229
Interest arrears on LDOD/Debt -0.08535 0.88884* -0.17785 0.03769 0.12409 0.15423
Principal arrears on LDOD/
Debt
-0.1022 0.84736* -0.00989 -0.14006 -0.06261 0.2479
Government Expenditure/GDP  0.2096 0.12429 0.12928 0.79534* 0.02363 0.29078
M2/Total Reserves -0.41073 0.49661* -0.4685 0.05535 -0.1585 0.337
Foreign Direct Investments/
GDP
0.66853* -0.27788 0.20131 -0.06331 -0.29768 0.3427
Note:  * the highest factor loading for each variable
Thus, from each dimension (component) we have selected no more than two to 
three variables (12 in total), according to the highest factor loading, which are 
sufficient to explain the whole dimension. The results of the rotated factor matrix 
are presented in Table 4. 
4.3. Stage 3: Building the Multivariate Panel Logit Model: Stepwise Gradual Method 
In this final stage we apply the Forward Stepwise Gradual Model Based Procedure 
for the multi-variate panel logit model construction, with the aim of developing 
parsimonious models, i.e. models that have a high degree of correct predictions 
and low Type I and Type II errors5. The reason for this gradual model building 
is to control for the variables that can be omitted (see Roubini, Mannase and 
5  Type I error occurs when actual defaults/reschedulings are classified by the model as non-
defaults/reschedulings. Type II error occurs when actual non-defaults/reschedulings are 
classified by the model as defaults/reschedulings. The cut-off point for classifying a probability 
as rescheduling or non-rescheduling is determined by default: cut off point of 0.522
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Schimmelpfenning (2003) and Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) for stepwise model-
building procedure). 
Our Forward Stepwise multivariate panel logit regressions indicate that there 
is a persistence in statistical significance of three variables, namely: Total debt/
GDP, Exports/GDP, and Current Account/GDP. We refer to those variables as 
‘fixed’ variables in the further text, as proposed in Sala-i-Martin (1997). ‘Fixed’ 
variables are used as a basis for the models we examine, while additional variables 
to be included in these multivariate logit models are selected using the forward 
stepwise procedure. Therefore, we generate two models that we believe are more 
accurate than others: 
1) Model I includes: the ‘Fixed’ variables, Foreign direct investments, General 
Government expenditures, Credits to private sector, Short-term debt, and the 
Lagged rescheduling record. 
2) Model II includes: the ‘Fixed’ variables, the Lagged rescheduling record, 
GDP growth, M2/Reserves and ICRG composite index. However, 8 of the 15 
countries analysed joined the EU during the sample period, which may lead 
to the improvement of the debt repayment record of a country. Thus, to test 
whether EU membership influences the probability of debt rescheduling, we 
add an EU dummy variable to Model II, taking value of 1 when a country 
becomes a member and zero otherwise, creating Model IIa.
Note that the probability of rescheduling in a multivariate panel logit framework 
is obtained in a similar manner to in equation (3): 
 (5)
where, in the multivariate panel logit model framework, β is a (k x 1) vector of 
parameters associated with the transposed vector of variables xit selected for the 
model. Finally, following Hausman (1978) test results, we apply random-effect 
logit model estimation6, indicating that state dependence appears to be very 
important in the case of sovereign debt rescheduling (as found in Aylward and 
Thorne (1998), Hajivassiliou (1989, 1994), McFadden et al. (1985), Brewer and 
Rivoli (1997), Carmen (1992) among many others). 
6  Random effects panel logit model (REM) is appropriate when there are cross sectional 
differences or heterogeneity, and this hetereogeneity is assumed to be not correlated with the 
regressors of the model. DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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5. RESULTS
The results for Model I, Model II, and Model IIa are presented in detail in Table 
5. All tested variables in Model I are highly statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% level of statistical significance, except for the Lagged dependent variable 
(rescheduling event) that has a p value slightly above the 10% significance level, 
and Foreign direct investments that are significant at 10%. All significant variables 
in Model I have the expected sign. Model I and the explanatory variables are 
jointly statistically significant at the 5% level, as indicated by p-values of the Wald 
Chi-squared test.
Since the logit model is non-linear, the coefficients obtained by Model I do not 
explain the contribution of each variable to the probability of rescheduling, but 
instead they represent odds ratios which are not easily interpreted. Therefore we 
calculate the real marginal effects that each of the variables has on the dependent 
variable. 
A closer look at the marginal effects for Model I shows a significant impact 
of explanatory variables on the probability of debt rescheduling, both ‘fixed’ 
explanatory variables and those less typically found in literature on emerging 
market debt rescheduling probabilities. For example, an increase in one unit 
of the ‘fixed’ variable Total Debt/GDP causes an increase in debt rescheduling 
probability by 2.55%, while a unit increase of Exports/GDP ratio causes 
decrease in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 7.03%. An increase in a 
unit of Current Account/GDP ratio causes a 5.06% increase in sovereign debt 
rescheduling probability 
This may seem counterintuitive, since it implies that the higher the current 
account surplus the more likely it is that the country will reschedule its debt. 
However for transitional economies, such as the countries in our sample, current 
account deficits may be associated with higher growth and financial integration 
in the region (see Abiad et. al., 2007), which in turn can lead to improvement 
of the debt repayment record of a country. The Foreign Direct Investment/GDP 
ratio variable shows the level of openness of the country, and is a significant 
indicator of the business climate in the country that wants to attract investment, 
so it is not a surprise that its unit increase causes a 9.4% decrease in sovereign 
debt rescheduling probability. Additionally, countries in transition are well 
known for their high levels of government spending; therefore, in our sample, 
a unit increase of Government Expenditure/GDP ratio causes a massive 19.25% 
increase in sovereign debt rescheduling probability.24
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Furthermore, in Table 2, we show that the impact of credits to private sector/
GDP and short term debt share in total debt variables on probability of debt 
rescheduling can be somewhat ambiguous. Both of those variables are significant 
at the 5% level and negatively related to the probability of debt rescheduling. 
Specifically, it seems that a country is less likely to reschedule if there is a higher 
percentage of short-term debt in total debt. In countries in transition, given their 
economic and other uncertainties and risks7, it is not surprising that short-term 
debt is percieved as less likely to default than long-term debt. In terms of credits 
to private sector/GDP, it is possible that private sector investments in transition 
economies are perceived as showing higher levels of credibility than the public 
sector. Furthermore, this variable can be an indicator of ownership restructuring 
and potential for higher future GDP growth, which in turn decreases the 
probability of sovereign debt rescheduling. Thus an increase in credits to the 
private sector can decrease the risk of sovereign debt rescheduling probability as 
a strong indicator of private sector development in transition countries, which 
investors take into account when they calculate the net present values of their 
investments. 
Model II and its explanatory variables are jointly significant at the 1% level. 
Although the majority of the variables used in the model are significant, such 
as the ‘fixed’ variables (at the 1% or 5% level), GDP growth (at the 1% level) and 
lagged rescheduling event (at the 1% level), our findings show that political factors 
(ICRG index) and liquidity variable M2/Reserves do not significanlty influence 
debt rescheduling in the region. 
Marginal effects in Model II show that one additional debt rescheduling event 
increases the probability that the country will reschedule in the future by 3.85%. 
A unit increase in total debt/GDP and current account/GDP increases the 
probability of debt rescheduling by 3.79% and 9.29% respectively, whereas a unit 
increase in export/GDP and GDP growth rate decreases the probability of debt 
rescheduling by 10.29% and 5.54% respectively. The persistently high influence 
of export/GDP variable in both Model I and Model II can be explained by the 
fact that the countries that we are focusing on are mainly small open economies, 
highly influenced by terms of international trade and finance. At the same time 
exports are generating revenues and GDP growth, and represent the drivers of 
stability of these countries. In conclusion, besides the current account and the 
level of total debt burden, these small open economies’ investment opportunities 
are highly dependent on their past rescheduling records.
7  For further details see Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001)26
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One of the results of Model II that we believe requires more attention is the 
insignificance of the political variable, which has been found to be important 
in many previous studies. One reason for this could be the decrease of potential 
political risks and stabilisation in the region during the period observed in this 
study. Specifically, in the later part of our sample period, most of the countries 
entered the final phase of transition while some of them joined the European 
Union. To check for the ultimate importance of being a member of the European 
Union (perceived in this context as a political factor variable), we extend Model 
II by including an EU dummy variable to create Model IIa. The insignificant EU 
dummy coefficient in Model IIa implies that EU membership does not affect 
sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities in EE countries during the sample 
period. 
Overall, in terms of determinants of debt rescheduling, it turns out that variables 
which are more specific for countries in transition have greater impact on debt 
rescheduling than variables traditionally considered as the most influential ones 
according to the literature (e.g. political factors, reserves to imports, total debt 
service payment to exports, inflation, indicators of exchange rate overvaluation, 
etc.) 
In the search for the most accurate model, in terms of higher forecasting accuracy 
and lower Type I and Type II errors, Model I appears better than Model II and 
Model IIa in that it has a higher prediction level (81.37% of correct classification) 
and very low Type II error (3.73%). However, Type I error for Model I is quite 
high (14.9%). Since for international lenders it is potentially more important to 
correctly classify actual reschedulings (than actual non-reschedulings), that is to 
have a lower Type I error, Model II (and IIa) is better in this context, generating 
a very low level of Type I error (3.73%). However Model II and IIa have a lower 
number of total correct predictions (75.78%) compared to Model I, which also 
implies that Type II error has increased (20.5%). Such a Type II error in Model II 
(IIa) implies that the model is too restrictive, classifying 1/5 of non-rescheduling 
events as rescheduling. Thus applicability of this model is limited to only very 
risk-averse investors. Furthermore Model II could deter potential investors, as it 
overstates the possibility of rescheduling. This could decrease growth possibilities 
in these small open economies, slowing the speed of transition and increasing the 
debt burden while waiting for potential investors. Therefore the analysis suggests 
that in order to control both for model accuracy and Type I error, investors would 
find both of these models useful. DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides new empirical evidence about the determinants and 
importance of international and country-specific macroeconomic indicators of 
the sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities of the EE countries. During the 
economic transition the EE countries became a very attractive European region 
creating an investment boom. The region became the largest recipient of net non-
FDI inflows among all emerging market regions in 2005. Developing models that 
can provide more accurate estimates of debt rescheduling probabilities in this 
region can benefit investors as well as the host countries. 
This study estimates sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities using panel 
logit models on a sample of 15 EE countries over the period 1990-2005. Compared 
to previous studies performed in this area, this paper combines different 
econometric methodologies to develop models with a high degree of accuracy. 
The findings show that in predicting the debt rescheduling probabilities one 
should utilise both of the two models suggested. Particularly, the models imply 
that EE countries that want to reduce their probabilities of rescheduling, therefore 
reducing cost of borrowing and/or improve access to credit, should generally: 
1) Control and reduce their general government expenditures by restructuring 
the public sector, attract more Foreign Direct Investment and stimulate GDP 
growth. 
2) Increase their export revenues by implementing a strategic trade policy in 
order to balance their current accounts 
3) Demonstrate good repayment performance by limiting the size of the external 
debt compared to their GDP and not default on sovereign debt as a result of 
unwillingness, rather than inability, to repay.
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